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INTRODUCTION 
This is a turtle case. One ancient metaphysical view of the world stated that 
the world lay atop of a pagoda supported by elephants. The elephants stood on top of the 
back of a turtle which swam in the ether. This ancient construct of the world did not have 
an answer for what the turtle swam in. When pressed on this issue in assessing his own 
metaphysics, the famous English philosopher, John Locke, stated in his Essays Concerning 
Human Understanding that the substrate of the universe was "something I know not what." 
So it is with all circular arguments. The adoption agency, in crafting a circular 
argument to support its contention that Utah may exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne, can 
never confront the base issue: On what basis can a Utah court exercise jurisdiction over Mr. 
Osborne? The agency can talk about best interests of the child and the legislature's purpose 
in enacting the adoption code, and about Mr. Osbornefs being involved with a married 
woman and about all of the disasters that would happen if their argument is not correct, and 
even about a simple clerical error with respect to the payment of a fee to the Court of 
Appeals (an error so destructive to Mr. Osborne's claims), but at the end, the agency still has 
not addressed the basic and fundamental question facing this Court: On what basis does 
Utah have the raw power to pass judgment on Mr. Osborne's parental rights? Each of the 
issues just mentioned has an obvious and simple explanation, all of them inuring to Mr. 
Osborne's favor, but the most potent and most vexing question is the one the agency must 
skirt: How are we talking about Utah law in the first place? 
The agency does spend some time in its brief discussing the status exemption 
1 
as a basis for personal jurisdiction, and it is gratifying that it actually addresses the issue 
before the Court for a portion of its brief, but it spends far too much time arguing matters that 
are simply not at all relevant or germane. Until the jurisdictional inquiry is answered, 
nothing else is relevant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGENCY REPEATEDLY MISCITES AUTHORITY AND 
MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRUE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL 
1. The Agency's Miscomprehension of the Nature of Adoption 
Mr. Osborne raised, and then rebutted, the status exception to personal 
jurisdiction in his brief. The agency's treatment of the status exception need not be discussed 
in depth, inasmuch as the agency has cited nothing new in its opposition that Mr. Osborne 
did not state in his brief in chief. There are a few specific points that should be addressed, 
however. 
The agency perseverates in arguing that for some reason termination 
proceedings are completely unrelated to adoption proceedings. They do so in the face of 
multiple authority quoted in the brief in chief, which authority states that adoption is a 
bifurcated proceeding in which termination is an important and constitutionally significant 
component. If the law were as Balkanized as the agency claims, bar exams would be far 
easier than they are. 
2. The Agency' s Mistreatment of Authority Discussing Jurisdiction 
in Adoption/Custody Cases 
2 
The adoption agency has made the miscalculation several times in its brief of 
misciting authority. This is quite unfortunate. For example, in its continuing self-imposed 
exile from the reality of adoptions and the fact that adoptions are a bifurcated proceeding 
entailing both termination and custody, they create artificial distinctions between termination 
as a stand-alone proceeding and termination pursuant to adoption. For example, they state 
that the Wasserman article that Mr. Osborne cites with some frequency in his brief in chief1 
does not even mention adoption. In reality, the Wasserman article sets up as a foil the 
Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme article (Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption 
After Shaffer and Kulko) that is so enamored of status jurisdiction in adoption (Wasserman 
at n. 15, p. 816), discusses in detail all of the Supreme Court adoption cases (Wasserman at 
n. 28, p. 820), and cites Justice Traynor article's discussion of adoption (the Traynor article 
was relied on heavily in May v. Anderson (Wasserman at n. 308, p. 873)). The Wasserman 
article is all about adoption. Indeed, her thesis is enhanced in adoption cases, since her 
emphasis is on custody actions (which are not terminal), as opposed to adoption cases (which 
are terminal). 
3. The Agency's Mischaracterization of North Carolina Law 
Perhaps it would be easy to forgive the agency's rather unsophisticated 
treatment of scholarly work were it not for a greater and grosser mischaracterization of 
applicable authority found in their brief. They cite the North Carolina case of Rosero v. 
Barents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 University of Illinois Law 
Review 813. 
3 
Blake2 for the proposition that Mr. Osborne was required to initiate a custody action under 
Chapter 49 of the North Carolina General Statutes to legitimate Kenneth. They then impugn 
Mr. Osborne for not doing so, and for his alleged failure to name the mother and child as 
defendants. They also suggest that Mr. Osborne must prove his paternity by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
None of the agency's contentions are true, or even relevant. Apart from the 
fact that the North Carolina Supreme Court has decided to review Rosero (decided as it was 
over a strong dissent), the case did not deal with the North Carolina adoption code, nor with 
the rights of a father to give consent under that code. Rather, it dealt with the interplay of 
two separate chapters of North Carolina law (Chapter 49 (Bastardy) and Chapter 110 (Child 
Welfare)). The Court concluded that even though the father had acknowledged paternity 
under Chapter 110, his common law duty to overcome the mother's presumption of fitness 
was not abrogated by the specific language of Chapter 49. So, back to district court it went 
to see if he could rebut the presumption. 
Rosero was, then, a custody case, not a parental rights case or an adoption case. 
Rosero does not change the fact that Mr. Osborne is a presumed father under North Carolina 
adoption law, having held Kenneth out as his own and having provided a home for him. Nor 
does it discredit one whit Mr. Osborne's paternity action in North Carolina, since Mr. 
Osborne brought that action properly under Chapter 50 (Divorce and custody), the 
2563 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. App. 2002). 
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recognized standard for all claimants to custody in North Carolina.3 The propriety of his 
action is borne out by (1) the fact that he has secured a default in that action against the 
natural mother, and (2) the fact that the North Carolina court has issued a preliminary 
injunction in the matter staying the Utah adoption as against the agency and the adoptive 
parents.4 
Once the Rosero red herring is swept aside, what is left for the agency to 
impugn Mr. Osborne's rights under North Carolina law? Nothing at all. Having put its eggs 
in the Rosero basket, the agency is now forced to acknowledge that Mr. Osborne did not need 
to take any affirmative action in North Carolina to protect his rights.5 
3
"Had the Legislature intended G.S. 50-13.1 to apply to only those custody 
disputes involved in a divorce or separation, it would have expressly so provided, as it did 
in the prior statutes G.S. 50-13 and G.S. 50-16. The mere fact that G.S. 50-13.1 is found 
in the Chapter of the General Statutes governing Divorce and Alimony is not sufficient to 
cause its application to be restricted to custody disputes involved in separation or 
divorce." Oxendine v. Catawba County Dept. of Social Services, 281 S.E.2d 370, 374 
(N.C. 1981). 
4The agency shrugs this off with the standard defense-attorney-on-the-courthouse-
steps epithet "We'll appeal!" That will be hard for the agency, having made a grave 
tactical error in sending a letter to Judge Redwing arguing the merits of the motion for 
temporary restraining order. (Ths was documented in a prior supplementation to the 
Record submitted to this Court ancillary to these proceedings), Sending that letter was 
making a general appearance, the very thing that Mr. Osborne has not done here. 
Furthermore, the agency's nationwide presence in phonebooks (directly and through 
referral clearinghouses) and on the internet (where it solicits placements from birth 
mothers nationwide) is sufficient to confer North Carolina courts with jurisdiction over 
the agency. 
5One must ask, "So what?" Subsection 4.15 is not even relevant, since there is no 
basis to apply Utah law to Mr. Osborne. This entire discussion underscores the fact that 
North Carolina courts should be doing this analysis, not Utah courts. 
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In short, the agency has consistently misrepresented or mischaracterized 
applicable law in its brief, to an alarming degree. The agency states in its brief, "Osborne is 
presumed to know the law." Response at 34. Indeed. 
II. OSBORNE'S CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT 
The adoption agency has expressed disapproval of the manner in which Mr. 
Osborne has sought relief before this Court. Specifically, the agency alleges that there are 
deficiencies in seeking mandamus in this matter because of Osborne's failure to first seek 
relief in the district court. The agency also expresses concern over whether this Court even 
has mandamus jurisdiction, and whether Mr. Osborne has stated the proper standard of 
review to assess the Court of Appeals' decision. In short, the agency, at a variety of junctures 
in its brief, asks "Why are we here?" 
We are here because there is no other place to be. We are here because Mr. 
Osborne's original petition for relief in the district court was killed at birth by that same court, 
a court that would not even allow Mr. Osborne to serve a party defendant. Given this fact, 
it was impossible for Mr. Osborne to appeal from that court's ruling, since the effect of the 
court's ruling was to deprive Mr. Osborne of a defendant to sue. 
We are here because that same district court then ex parte and with knowledge 
that Mr. Osborne had retained counsel in the State of Utah, purported to terminate Mr. 
Osborne's rights unilaterally and in collusion with the agency. It was impossible for Mr. 
Osborne to appeal from that ruling because the agency decided not to reveal the existence of 
that court's ex parte order terminating Mr. Osborne's rights until after any applicable time for 
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filing an appeal had expired. In making this argument, the agency is at best brash, and at 
worst less than forthright. 
We are here because the federal district court that originally heard Mr. 
Osborne's challenge to Utah's exercise of personal jurisdiction expressed grave doubts as to 
whether it could even rule on the matter because of state law abstention concerns (under 
either Rooker v. Feldman ox Pullman abstention, arguments that were raised by the agency). 
We are here because it would be impossible for Mr. Osborne to file a personal 
jurisdiction challenge in state court without waiving that challenge under current Utah law, 
law that the district court would be obliged to follow (but that this Court is free to reassess). 
On this issue the agency speak with forked tongue. On the one hand, it excoriates Mr. 
Osborne for not bringing a personal jurisdiction challenge in state court, while at the same 
time devotes a number of pages in its brief (indeed, an entire section) on how such a 
challenge is internally inconsistent and legally impossible. 
We are here because Mr. Osborne's attempt to divulge information regarding 
the pendency of the adoption was thwarted by at least one district court, which was merely 
a harbinger of the fact that trying to discover where the adoption was pending in every 
district court in the State of Utah, was so impracticable and had such a small likelihood of 
success that it was impossible. For this reason, mandamus was sought to stop the adoption 
in its tracks wherever it might be. Only a court with statewide jurisdiction (such as this 
Court) had the power to issue such a mandamus. 
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We are here, more importantly, because this Court has granted permission via 
certiorari for us to be here. And, most important, we are here because this is the only place 
we can be, and because this is the right place to be. 
In its statement of the case, the adoption agency coyly states that the first time 
that Mr. Osborne raised his concerns about personal jurisdiction was in his federal court 
action. This sly manipulation of the facts is accomplished by stating that the first time Mr. 
Osborne "directly" raised the personal jurisdiction issue was in federal court. This slight of 
hand is required because Mr. Osborne specifically stated in his challenge to subject matter 
jurisdiction in the Fourth Judicial District Court that he reserved the right to raise personal 
jurisdiction should the court conclude that it had subject matter jurisdiction. 
Mr. Osborne has not changed lanes or hidden the ball. His strategy has been 
clear from the very beginning. He first questioned the subject matter jurisdiction of the Utah 
District Court, expressly reserving his right to raise personal jurisdiction. When it became 
obvious that the Court would exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction 
argument then needed to be placed in the forefront. 
Yet how could Mr. Osborne raise this argument in state district court given the 
existence of In re BBD1 This was not tenable. Accordingly, he sought relief from the 
federal district court, concluding (rightfully) that an appearance in a federal court would not 
constitute an appearance in state court that could be used against him as a predicate for 
waiver (and the agency already was asserting that the subject matter challenge did constitute 
such a waiver). Yet, the federal court expressed great hesitancy to rule on the issues 
8 
presented because they dealt with state law and presented grave federal questions of 
deference to state judiciaries expressed in various abstention doctrines. In short, the federal 
tribunal was not interested in the case and wanted the state court to resolve it. 
When the federal court showed its hand, Mr. Osborne took the federal court's 
cue and, notwithstanding the risk that a state tribunal might assert that Mr. Osborne was 
waiving his personal jurisdiction defense by even appearing, he filed his original petition 
with the Court of Appeals. An original petition with a state appellate tribunal was necessary 
because to have filed such an action in the state district court would have cinched the Catch-
22 he had been fearing all along (that is, by raising the issue in state court, he immediately 
waives it.) Ironically, the Court of Appeals never got to the jurisdiction issue, instead racing 
right over it and moving to an analysis of Mr. Osborne's rights without stating its 
jurisdictional predicate to do so. Hence the basis for the writ of certiorari.6 
6
 A detailed examination of the record reveals that originally the relief that Mr. 
Osborne requested was simply a directive that the location of the adoption proceedings be 
revealed and that Mr. Osborne be given a safe haven to proceed with his personal 
jurisdiction argument in district court without having been deemed to have waived that 
argument. 
Furthermore, the agency's argument that Mr. Osborne has changed lanes in 
reserving his personal jurisdiction argument simply is a mischaracterization of the record. 
Mr. Osborne has consistently asserted the collusive nature of requiring his appearance in 
state court in a "gotcha" manner. It is disingenuous for the agency to continue to cite Mr. 
Osborne's failure to appear in state court to raise his personal jurisdiction challenge, when 
the agency has consistently argued that the limited appearance Mr. Osborne has already 
made in state court constitutes a waiver of that argument. Once again, the agency 
consistently and brazenly asserts that Mr. Osborne is in a Catch-22 and then tasks him to 
do anything about it. 
9 
The Court of Appeals exceeded its mandate in issuing the opinion that it did. 
Instead of simply telling Mr. Osborne, "No, we're not going to tell you in which court the 
matter is pending; go file a collateral action," and "No, we're not going to give you the safe 
haven you're asking for; let the district court figure it out," the Court of Appeals said, "No, 
we're not going to give you anything you ask for, and, to top it off, we're going to enter into 
a detailed analysis of your rights under Utah law as a predicate for our decision." It is this 
last analysis under Utah law that essentially destroyed any chance of Mr. Osborne raising the 
issue in district court, because a district court would immediately attach itself to the Court 
of Appeals' decision and feel bound by that decision (and rightfully so). Thus, by virtue of 
the extremely broad nature of the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals, the only solution 
left to Mr. Osborne was to file his petition for certiorari, and that is why, notwithstanding the 
genesis of the writ of mandamus and for temporary restraining order, this Court should 
dispositively rule on the issues raised by Mr. Osborne with respect to the extent of Utah's 
personal jurisdiction in adoptions such as this. 
III. THE EX PARTE TERMINATION OF MR. OSBORNE'S RIGHTS HURTS, 
RATHER THAN HELPS, THE AGENCY'S CASE 
In every case there are good facts and there are bad facts. As an advocate, you 
hoist your good facts from the highest flagstaff, and you take your bad facts and, without 
denying them, bury them as deeply as you can. 
It is, therefore, very surprising that the adoption agency would rely on the 
Fourth Judicial District Court's ex parte termination of his parental rights as a predicate for 
10 
their argument. That proceeding was repugnant. The adoption agency may wish to hoist its 
black flag as high as it may; it only underscores the equity of Mr. Osborne's position. 
IV. MR. OSBORNE'S POSTURE AS A DEFENDANT IS MANDATED BY THE 
NATURE OF THE ADOPTION STATUTE, WHICH AFFIRMATIVELY REACHES 
OUT AND TERMINATES NATURAL FATHERS' RIGHTS IN SE, AND NOT 
PREDICATED ON ANY AFFIRMATIVE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
Mr. Osborne has consistently argued that the procedural posture of this case 
is, by any reckoning, unusual. As noted in Swain v. LDS Social Services1 (a case cited in the 
opening brief, and which the agency conveniently ignores) the adoption statute acts like a 
plaintiff and puts the putative father in a defensive posture. Thus, any action the putative 
father takes is in the nature of the action of a defendant, not a plaintiff. This is the predicate 
for Mr. Osborne's argument that he be treated like a defendant in this matter and be allowed 
to avail himself of the protections afforded by Rule 12 allowing for special appearances (or, 
in its modern incantation, a Rule 12(b) challenge to personal jurisdiction). The agency 
simply refuses to accept this position. It does devote a tremendous amount of time and 
energy in its brief to proving Mr. Osborne's point: he is in a Catch-22. The agency states, 
"Yes, this is a Catch-22. Sorry. You lose." 
In declaring this point by fiat, the agency wrongly states that "Osborne assumes 
for purposes of his entire brief that he is in no different position than a father who has fully 
developed parental rights." Response Brief at 18. This is false. Ms. Osborne does not claim 
that he is a father with fully developed parental rights. That is an issue for the courts and law 
71999UT70, 984P.2d967. 
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of North Carolina to determine.8 Rather, he assumes that he is a citizen of a sovereign state 
of the Union other than Utah, which citizen has no contacts with the State of Utah. All of 
this is true and undisputed. Having this status, he is entitled to the same protections of any 
other citizen of the United States in determining whether or not the legislature and the courts 
of a state foreign to him is able to exercise control over him. That is what Mr. Osborne 
assumes for purposes of his entire brief. 
Yet the agency would twist this simple jurisdictional declaration of state 
sovereignty into a broad assertion of parental sovereignty. The agencyfs illogical tactical 
position is explained somewhat by its refusal to adopt the analytical construct proposed by 
the brief in chief: that a personal jurisdiction analysis by its very nature must antedate and 
predicate an analysis of the putative father's respective rights. Indeed, one need only examine 
the agency's transubstantiation of Lehr v. Robertson9 to see clearly its approach. The agency 
quietly transforms Lehr from a case in which the New York Legislature passed rules 
governing New York putative fathers to a case where the state legislature of any state may 
enact rules governing putative fathers in any other state, as long as that putative father's child 
ends up in the legislature's state. Indeed, the agency takes the fact that the putative father in 
Lehr was a "non-party" and confers the right of any legislature in the Union to confer that 
8But, as noted in the brief in chief, the laws of North Carolina are clear that Mr. 
Osborne would prevail on this point once a North Carolina tribunal is permitted to 
entertain it, a right such tribunal should retain implicitly under these circumstances.. 
9463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). 
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status (or "non-status," as the case may be) upon any father whose chromosomes end up 
within that legislature's jurisdiction. 
Yet, the question remains begged: By what authority may the Utah Legislature 
declare Mr. Osborne a non-party? Even that question requires an exercise of jurisdiction. 
These unanswered questions show the circularity of the agency's argument. 
V. MR. OSBORNE'S CHALLENGE TO UTAH JURISDICTION IS NOT A FACIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ADOPTION CODE, BUT TO ANY 
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCT OF THAT CODE THAT WOULD CONFER PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION WITHOUT MINIMUM CONTACTS AND FAIRNESS. SUCH A 
CHALLENGE, BY DEFINITION, IS A CHALLENGE TO THE STATUTE AS 
APPLIED, AND, AS SUCH, IS LIMITED TO THOSE SPARSE CASES SIMILAR TO 
MR. OSBORNE'S. 
Perhaps recognizing that its argument keeps running into the same road block 
with respect to due process, the agency resorts to scare tactics. It states that adopting Mr. 
Osborne's position would be a disaster in the making. In so stating, the agency claims that 
every single interstate adoption that has been finalized in the State of Utah will now be 
subject to challenge. 
This mischaracterization of reality is regrettable and reflects desperation. The 
vast majority of interstate adoptions are effected either with the putative father's consent or 
in circumstances where the putative father's home state makes a threshold determination that 
his consent is not required. If, by operation of the law of the putative father's home state the 
putative father has no rights, then Utah is entitled to rely on the putative father's state's 
determination of his rights. For example, a putative father residing in Utah who does not 
take the steps required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14 does not have the ability to 
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challenge an Oregon adoption of his child on the basis of personal jurisdiction. This is 
because in the bifurcated proceeding of adoption (in which termination and custody are 
determined), the termination prong is already resolved by the putative fathers home state. 
The adopting state treats termination as a fait accompli, and therefore is taking no judicial 
action towards the putative father so as to violate his rights of due process vis-a-vis personal 
jurisdiction.10 
Filtering out, therefore, cases in which consent is secured or termination is 
accomplished by the home state?s laws, only a small percentage of remaining interstate 
adoptions would pose any difficulties whatsoever in protecting putative fathers1 rights. As 
noted in Mr. Osbornefs brief in chief and also the statefs response brief in the In re WA case 
pending before this Court, an easy solution to this problem is to simply provide putative 
fathers in such circumstances with procedural due process. In other words, they should be 
advised of the fact that an adoption is pending. If termination of the father's rights is not 
effected by self-operation of that state's laws (as it is in Utah and many other states), a 
judicial proceeding would be warranted in the putative fathers home state for a declaration 
of his rights vis-a-vis the adoption, following the minimum requirements imposed by that 
10Of course, Utah could only accept such a fait accompli if it were worthy of full 
faith and credit. Thus, if a nonresident father were to judicially challenge the termination 
of his rights in his home state, Utah would need to abate further action until the home 
state was able to resolve the matter. Utah certainly could not compel the father to come 
to Utah to make such a challenge. Not only would this be a violation of the father's due 
process rights, but it would place Utah courts in the unenviable and awkward position of 
adjudicating the meaning of other states' laws to assess full faith and credit. Efficiency in 
conflicts resolution mandates that the home state be the venue where such decisions are 
made. 
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home state as if the adoption were occurring there (the Interstate Compact requires such an 
assessment, even though the Compact is itself a toothless tiger when it comes to doing 
anything about violations). This is a satisfactory way to achieve both due process protections 
for the father and to recognize interstate comity. Notice of such proceedings could be 
effected by publication.11 If they fail to respond to notice of such pending proceedings, then 
their failure to intervene in the proceedings should be regarded as a default. 
This being said, it may be true, if Mr. Osborne prevails, that interstate 
adoptions in Utah will cease. At least, that is, by slipshod agencies that fail to do their 
homework. But the vast majority of interstate adoptions, given the protections offered by the 
operation of the laws of the putative father's home state, will be ensured ultimate success.12 
11
 It is wholly constitutional to terminate one's parental rights by giving them notice 
of termination proceedings, even if that notice is by publication. See, e.g., Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972)("We note in passing that the incremental cost of 
offering unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears to be 
minimal. If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children, 
they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do care, under the scheme here held 
invalid, Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to afford them a properly 
focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding. Extending opportunity for hearing 
to unwed fathers who desire and claim competence to care for their children creates no 
constitutional or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so 
inclined. The Illinois law governing procedure in juvenile cases, 111. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 
704-1 et seq., provides for personal service, notice by certified mail, or for notice by 
publication when personal or certified mail service cannot be had or when notice is 
directed to unknown respondents under the style of "All whom it may Concern." Unwed 
fathers who do not promptly respond cannot complain if their children are declared wards 
of the State. Those who do respond retain the burden of proving their fatherhood."). A 
termination proceeding in a putative father's home state ancillary to a Utah adoption, 
therefore, would not necessarily be a drawn-out affair. 
12The legislature took a stab at such an approach by drafting Utah Code Annot. § 
78-30-4.15, but failed to consider those cases in which the assessment of the father's 
compliance with his state's law cannot be done by a Utah court for lack of jurisdiction. 
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In sum, there is a spectrum between protecting putative fathers' rights and 
securing speedy and secure adoptions for eligible newborns. The pendulum has simply 
swung too far on the spectrum toward speed and away from protection. This is especially 
true in the State of Utah, which has become a national warehouse for the placement and 
adoption of babies from all over the country. In order to cut costs and to reassure anxious 
adoptive parents, rudimentary investigations into the putative father's whereabouts or status 
have simply been ignored in many Utah placements, especially by for-profit agencies (like 
the Adoption Center of Choice). Mr. Osborne's case is an example of one of these, but is not 
by any means the only one, nor is the Adoption Center of Choice the only agency that is 
engaged in this type of conduct. Admittedly, there will be a small number of interstate 
adoptions that will be held out for a longer period of time before finalization because of 
inability to locate the putative father and the necessity of commencing ancillary proceedings 
in the putative father's home state to terminate his rights under the laws of that state (either 
under its adoption code, or through other means), but taking the opposite approach and 
unilaterally terminating the rights of known and concerned putative fathers who have a viable 
claim to their children under their state's own law is far more repugnant than allowing a few 
adoptions to be delayed for a number of months were putative fathers cannot be found.13 
Thus, in those few cases where jurisdiction will not lie, the assessment should be done by 
the home state, not Utah. 
13As for the agency's argument that the adoptive parents cannot adopt Kenneth in 
North Carolina, that is why there is an Interstate Compact facilitating interstate 
placement. The Compact allows placement of a nonresident baby in Utah as long as the 
home state's laws are complied with, without the need for the adoptive parents to proceed 
in the home state. Admittedly, this particular adoption will not happen if this court 
16 
One must not lose here the forest through the trees. Mr. Osborne is in a very 
small class of individuals who have acted to protect their parental rights and have done so 
not only by providing for the child, but have also intervened to litigate their interests. Query 
how many more adoptions will continue to be challenged on a variety of grounds, and how 
many of those adoptions will be frustrated after bonding has already occurred, by fathers like 
Mr. Osborne. This state should not adopt a policy of "adopt first and ask questions later." 
The vast majority of the states have consent and notice schemes that would 
easily be amenable to a more balanced approach. If there are states that would not, perhaps 
Utah should reconsider ignoring those states' interests simply to make sure that every child 
placed for adoption in this state is successfully adopted, irrespective of the interests of the 
rendering state or the putative father therein. One should also consider the credibility of the 
agency making its "disaster" argument, since it does operate for profit and may be more 
interested in protecting its pocketbook than the public policy. 
Furthermore, Mr. Osborne's challenge in this case is not to the text of the 
statute itself, but to a judicial interpretation of the statute that allows its extraterritorial 
application to nonresidents. Any statute operating in such a fashion would be 
unconstitutional. In this respect, Mr. Osborne's challenge is limited to the facts under which 
he brings it: it is an as-applied challenge. Mr. Osborne seeks clarification of In re B.B.D. in 
circumstances such as his where the personal jurisdiction argument has not been waived by 
declines jurisdiction, since it should be obvious by now that Mr. Osborne will not give the 
consent he must under North Carolina law. But if the adoptive parents wish to adopt a 
non-Utah baby, nothing would stop them, as long as they are willing to comply with the 
law. 
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a general appearance or other substantive challenges under Utah law, and in which the 
putative father clearly has a right to have his status adjudicated by his home court.14 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Osborne is a North Carolina resident who simply does not belong in Utah. 
This Court should assess its jurisdiction before attempting to pass on his rights under Lehr, 
this being the only proper course under applicable Supreme Court precedent. Warnings of 
disaster caused by such an approach are a gross exaggeration, and, in any event, the 
Constitution does not cotton to convenience. The extreme adaptability of the American legal 
system would yield new solutions within the Constitutional confines argued by Mr. Osborne, 
just as our federal system responded to the Balkanization of jurisdiction feared by scholars 
as a result of International Shoe. National jurisdiction in adoption is not to be, just as 
national jurisdiction in general was not to be when Pennoyer v. Neffwas jettisoned by 
International Shoe. 
14As such, this Court could limit its ruling in this matter to the facts presented to it 
in this matter, thus making its ruling very narrow and having very little precedential 
effect, if any, on subsequent adoptions that do not fall within the factual construct posed 
by Mr. Osborne's case. As noted, individuals in Mr. Osborne's position would be 
relatively rare. At least, that is the hope, as soon as the adoption agencies who continue 
to run roughshod over both the laws of the State of Utah and of other states start to run a 
tighter ship and make sure the adoptions they contract for are properly legal in the first 
place. 
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This Court should issue an order vacating the pending adoption, and declare 
that Utah has no jurisdiction over the same. Then Mr. Osborne can pursue regaining custody 
in North Carolina. 
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